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Internet Policy Going Forward: Does One Size Still Fit All?
Christopher S. Yoo

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) December 2010 Open Internet
Order represents a major turning point in U.S. regulation of the Internet, although the direction
that Internet policy will take in the future is far from clear. The D.C. Circuit’s 2010 decision
holding that the FCC lacked the authority to sanction Comcast for interfering with BitTorrent
and other peer-to-peer technologies1 ensured that the initial clashes over the Open Internet Order
would focus on the scope of the FCC’s jurisdiction.2 At the same time, public interest groups
have challenged the FCC’s decision to leave wireless broadband services outside the scope of
some the rules.3 Resolving the merits of these particular controversies is an important matter that
will likely represent the primary focus of Internet policy for the foreseeable future.
At the same time, the Open Internet Order is also based on a number of other
propositions that may well prove even more influential over the long run and are worth exploring
critically. One premise that I find particularly interesting is the belief that the Internet’s past
success stemmed from the fact that there has always been a single Internet that was open to
everyone.4 As is always the case, this argument is only as persuasive as the assumptions on
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Comcast Corp .v FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Verizon has filed an appeal with the D.C. Circuit challenging the FCC’s jurisdiction to issue the Open Internet
Order. See Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 30, 2011).
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See Free Press v. FCC, No. 11-2123 (1st Cir. filed Sept. 28, 2011); People’s Production House v. FCC, No. 113905 ag (2d Cir. filed Sept. 26, 2011); Media Mobilizing Project v. FCC, No. 11-3627 (3d Cir. filed Sept. 26, 2011);
Mountain Area Information Network v. FCC, No. 11-2036 (4th Cir. filed Sept. 26, 2011); Access Humboldt v. FCC,
No. 11-72849 (9th Cir. filed Sept. 26, 2011). On October 6, 2011, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
consolidated all of these appeals in the D.C. Circuit. In re Petitions for Review of the Federal Communications
Commission’s In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, No. 1:11-ca-01356 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 6, 2011) (order
granting motion to consolidate).
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Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 17905, 17934 ¶ 49 (2010) [hereinafter Open Internet
Order] (“[T]here is one Internet (although it is comprised of a multitude of different networks), and ... it should
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which it is based. In this chapter, I would like to examine this proposition critically and explore
the policy implications that might follow if it turned out not to be true. Exploring the ways that
the Internet is likely to deviate from this "single Internet" vision and the implications of those
deviations may provide greater insight into how best to shape Internet policy over the next five
years.

The Longstanding Existence of Disconnected and Hybrid Networks

Despite the fact that discussions often somewhat casually treat the Internet as a single
entity, the Internet is widely recognized by those familiar with its operation to be a “network of
networks” composed of many smaller networks interconnected together. All of those networks
exchange information through a uniform standard known as the “Internet Protocol” (IP), which
represents the glue that binds the components into a larger coherent whole. In addition, Internet
traffic has traditionally traversed backbone providers that exchanged information at public
exchange points. When this was the case, networks exchanged traffic in a largely uniform
manner.
Over time, an increasing amount of traffic has begun to deviate from the traditional
pattern.5 Most importantly for our purposes, some firms rely on the Internet Protocol, but
transmit their data over proprietary networks. For example, during the Internet’s early days, the
acceptable use policy imposed on the NSFNET (the National Science Foundation Network)

remain open and interconnected....”); id. at 17956 ¶ 93 (“There is one Internet, which should remain open for
consumers and innovators alike....”); id. at 18041 (statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski) (“There is one
Internet, and it must remain an open platform....”).
5
See Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. ON
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 79, 85-90 (2010).

3
prohibited uses unrelated to research and education. This prompted the creation of private
backbones such as PSI, UUNET, and CerfNET, which operated in parallel with the NSFNET
backbone without interconnecting with it.6 In later years, firms began providing IP-based voice
services without traversing the public Internet in order to ensure improved security or greater
guaranteed quality of service, which caused the FCC to refrain from referring to these services as
“Internet telephony” and opt instead to use the terms “IP telephony” or “voice over Internet
protocol” (VoIP).7 In addition, a large proportion of IP-based video passes via managed services
without touching the public backbone.8 In short, a significant amount of IP-based traffic is
travelling over various proprietary networks that bypass the public Internet altogether. A large
amount of additional IP-based traffic employs hybrid systems that rely on proprietary or non-IP
based technologies to form part of the connection.9 In addition, most of these networks engage
in extensive network management that prioritizes certain traffic over other traffic.
Still other networks are moving away from exchanging data on the basis of IP in favor of
other technologies that support greater functionality. The most popular of these is known as
MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS). Instead of routing based on IP addresses, MPLS adds a
label to the front of each packet and routes on the basis of that label. In addition, each flow
(known as a Forwarding Equivalence Class) is assigned a specific path through the network.
Information about the label and the associated route are propagated to other MPLS-enabled
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Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 5 (Fed. Communications Comm’n Off.
of Plans & Policy Working Paper No. 32, 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf;
Barry M. Leiner et al., The Past and Future History of the Internet, COMM. ACM, Feb. 1997, at 102, 103.
7
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd 11501, 11541 n.173 (1998).
8
For example, AT&T’s U-Verse network uses private networks to distribute video content to its central offices and
then uses prioritized service to deliver programs to individual homes.
9
For example, third-generation wireless devices employed hybrid systems that used legacy, non-IP based
technologies to connect from the Internet gateway to the end-user device. Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing
Patterns of Internet Usage, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 67, 80, (2010). Many content delivery networks (CDNs) bypass the
public backbone by using private connections to connect directly to their distributed caches. Yoo, supra note 5, at
88-90.
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routers.10 Because labels are shorter than IP addresses, routers can direct traffic more rapidly.
The fact that the route for a particular flow is defined in advance gives end users greater control
over security. In addition, MPLS can support load balancing simply by dividing traffic between
the same two endpoints into two separate Forwarding Equivalence Classes and assigning them
different paths. Most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, in determining the particular
path that a particular flow will travel, the MPLS router can match the quality of service
demanded by the flow with the resources available along possible paths.11 MPLS can also
recover more quickly from route failure. While once used exclusively within a single network,
MPLS is now being employed across multiple networks, although doing so requires elaborate
coordination between the networks to exchange the necessary information about the labels.
In short, a significant amount of data traffic relies on proprietary or hybrid networks
rather than the public Internet. In fact, a leading industry study estimates that more than 25% of
all IP-based traffic did not rely exclusively on the public Internet in 2010, and it forecasts those
numbers to remain more or less stable through 2015.12 Almost all of these networks require the
negotiation of private interconnection agreements and engage in extensive network management
and prioritization. As such, they represent a significant deviation from the type of open,
interoperable networks presumed by the FCC’s Open Internet Order.
Moreover, it is plausible that positing the policy challenge as a mutually exclusive choice
between managed and unmanaged networks may represent a false dichotomy. The routers within
the core of the network are becoming increasingly programmable so that they can be
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Eric C. Rosen et al., Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture (IETF Request for Comments 3031, rel. Jan.
2001), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc3031.txt.pdf.
11
William Stallings, MPLS, INTERNET PROTOCOL J., Sept. 2001, at 2, 3-4.
12
CISCO SYS., INC., CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX 6 tbl. 2 (2011), available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-481360.pdf.
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dynamically reconfigured from the default setting of providing traditional Internet service to
provide a dedicated circuit instead. One leading example is Internet2’s Interoperable On-demand
Network (ION), which allows researchers to set up temporary or long-term dedicated point-topoint optical circuits to support large data transfers and other bandwidth-intensive
applications.13 This represents a sea change from Internet2’s previous position disfavoring
network management as a solution.14
The ability to reconfigure routers dynamically illustrates the problem wigth framing the
decision as an antipodean choice between two diametrical extremes. Instead, the two visions of a
single, openly accessible network on the one hand and a completely Balkanized universe of
noninterconnected private networks on the other represent polar extremes on a spectrum of
possible policy responses. Only by understanding the countervailing considerations can one
understand the forces that determine where along that spectrum social welfare would be
optimized and what types of changes in the economic and technological environment might
cause the optimal balance point to change.

Network Diversity vs. Network Size

The benefits attributed to the open Internet result in large part from the belief that being
part of the largest possible network creates benefits for every part of the Internet community.
End users benefit from being able to access content and applications without having to obtain
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Internet2, Internet2 ION: User-Provisioned Dedicated Circuits Reserved in Advance or On Demand,
http://www.internet2.edu/ion/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
14
Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 64, 66
(2006) (statement of Gary R. Bachula, Vice President, External Affairs, Internet2), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=c5bf9e54-b51f-4162-ab92-d8a6958a33f8.
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approval from network providers. Content and applications providers can reach the entire
universe of potential customers no matter how large or small they are.15 The increase in
demand, in turn, encourages network providers to upgrade their infrastructure, driving what the
FCC views as a “virtuous circle of innovation.”16 This argument takes as given that adding more
users to the network always creates additional benefits. Not only does it posit inexhaustible
demand-side returns to scale; it also presumes that there are no countervailing considerations that
could offset network size as a source of additional value.
Basic economic principles raise serious doubts as to the veracity of these propositions. As
an initial matter, the basic principle of diminishing returns to scale dictates that the marginal
benefits from adding additional customers will decline as the network continues to expand.
Moreover, the literature on network economic effects has long recognized that increases
in network size may be less important if end users value certain connections more than others.17
As a general matter, most Internet users tend to focus their online activities on a relatively small
number of endpoints. For example, studies have shown that although Facebook users have on
average approximately 130 friends, they communicate directly with no more than four other
people each week and only six other people each month.18 My own Internet usage exhibits
similarly asymmetric usage patterns. When I connect through my PC at home, I interact with two
network locations with greater frequency than any others: my email server and my office
computer (via remote desktop access). Beyond that, I concentrate the bulk of my usage in a
handful of websites that provide financial services (such as my bank) and news. While I
sometimes access a broader range of information, such as when I plan a vacation, conduct
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Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at 17910 ¶13.
Id. at 17910-11 ¶14, 17922 ¶28, 17927 ¶38, 17929 ¶40.
17
See MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE 20–24 (1997).
18
PAUL ADAMS, GROUPED 23 (2012).
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academic research, or search for activities for my children, I would willingly trade off somewhat
less effective connectivity to the broader range of websites in order to obtain better connectivity
to the locations that I know I visit the most. Although the ability to access other locations still
has value to me, the fact that I visit them less often means that it has less value.
When the value that end users place on locations is heterogeneous, value depends as
much on whether a particular network provides access to the locations that an end user values the
most as it does on network size. The same is true for content and application providers. The fact
that the revenue generated by the Internet overwhelmingly derives from advertising means that
content and application providers will place a higher value on end users who possess desirable
demographic characteristics and who can be targeted more effectively.19 Again, value is driven
not by having access to more customers, but rather by having access to the customers who are
the most valuable to a particular end user. Such differences in value represent a significant
countervailing factor that can more than offset the benefits from raw network size.20
In addition to providing better connections to the most preferred locations, networks can
also provide value by offering different services. Consider the way that the applications being
carried by the network are changing.21 When the Internet first emerged, the overwhelming
majority of traffic was dominated by two applications: email and web browsing. Although both
applications are quite different in many ways, both are essentially file transfer applications for
which application performance is determined by when the last packet arrives. As such, these
applications are not particularly sensitive to variations in the arrival times of intermediate
packets so long as they do not affect the arrival of the last packet.
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Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 683 (2005).
Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 34-36 (2005).
21
See generally CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET 19-36 (2012).
20
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The applications that are now beginning to dominate the Internet are quite different.
Specifically, Internet traffic is increasingly becoming dominated by video.22 In contrast to filetransfer applications such as email and web browsing, which are not particularly sensitive to
irregularities in the spacing between intermediate packets, any variation in the arrival pattern of
intermediate packets can seriously degrade video application performance. If the application can
tolerate a brief delay before video playback begins, applications can minimize the impact of such
variations by delaying playback until a sufficient number of packets are stored in a buffer to
smooth out any variations in arrival rates. Buffering, however, is a poor solution for interactive
applications, such as video conferencing.23
Although the Internet’s protocols were designed to be as flexible as possible, no
architecture can do everything well. Instead, every architectural design must pick and choose
among the functions it will support. In so doing, it necessarily omits support for other functions
required by other applications. Forcing everyone to interconnect in the same manner thus
inevitably promotes applications optimized for the services supported by the particular network
architecture while simultaneously inhibiting applications that require services that the network
cannot provide.24 In particular, the current Internet provides service on a best-efforts basis that
provides no guarantees about reliability or throughput times, which has long inhibited its ability
to support real-time applications.25
The loss of variety associated with standardization thus represents one of the often
ignored welfare losses associated with requiring that everyone be connected to a single, uniform
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See CISCO SYS., supra note 12, at 2, 9, 12-13.
Yoo, supra note 9, at 70-72.
24
Yoo, supra note 20, at 20-22; Yoo, supra note 9.
25
Yoo, supra note 20, at 21-22; Yoo, supra note 9, at 85; Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Innovation, and
Consumers, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 228-34.
23

9
network.26 In addition, diversifying service offerings also makes sense as a matter of business
strategy. Business leaders have long recognized that one of the worst ways to compete in a
market is to adopt a me-too strategy that simply mimics the actions of the market leader. Instead,
leading books on business strategy exhort companies to try to differentiate what they are
doing.27 Although such differentiation was once criticized as spurious and anticompetitive,28
we now recognize that product differentiation can create real benefits to consumers by allowing
them to purchase goods that provide a better fit with their preferences.29 The welfare losses
associated with the reduction in scale can be offset by the welfare benefits realized from product
variety.
Simply put, the optimality of the decision to standardize on a single, universally available
network depends on the heterogeneity of demand. If what everyone wants from the network is
the same, the optimal strategy is to design a single, large network optimized in the manner that
end users want. As the services that end users want from the network begin to diverge, network
providers have strong incentives to diversify their offerings in response. Such responses are not
necessarily anticompetitive and do not necessarily harm consumers. Instead, such diversification
may be regarded as the natural byproduct of providers’ attempt to satisfy consumer demand that
is becoming increasingly varied. Indeed, such heterogeneity can make it possible for smaller
providers to pursue niche strategies that allow them to survive despite their inability to fully
realize the available economies of scale. Conversely, preventing firms from varying their

26

See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 71
(1985) (noting that “reduction in variety” represents one of the “important social costs” of standardization); Michael
L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 110 (1994) (noting that
“the primary cost of standardization is loss of variety: consumers have fewer differentiated products to pick from”).
27
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 26-27, 32-33 (1999).
28
JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 114-43, 204, 212, 216, 220, 223, 236, 239, 262, 279-81, 263-317
(1956).
29
Yoo, supra note 20, at 30; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
212, 252-53 (2004).
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services forces them to compete exclusively on price and network size, which are considerations
that tend to favor the incumbents.30
This type of differentiation carries its own downsides. Those with strong preferences for
the services offered by one particular provider would not regard the other options as substitutes,
which would allow one provider to exert a degree of market power over them. Differentiation
thus represents the type of tradeoff inherent in imperfect price discrimination, which effectively
divides the larger market into submarkets and allows the provider to engage in monopoly pricing
against each submarket. That said, it is important to keep in mind that the welfare implications
are ambiguous, depending on whether the welfare benefits of expanding the number of
customers served exceed the welfare losses associated with monopoly pricing in each submarket
or vice versa.31 In addition, enabling some consumers to obtain services that fit better with their
preferences creates welfare benefits from outside the price-quantity space of classical
economics.32 The upside becomes more likely to dominate the downside as the ways that
consumers use the network become increasingly varied over time.
Moreover, benefits from network size need not cause market failure if an adapter or
converter exists that can allow end users on one network to interconnect on other networks. If the
adapters function perfectly, end users will seem like they are on a single network, and the market
will achieve the perfectly competitive result.33 Even if interconnection is imperfect, markets
need not necessarily fail.34 Specifically, if the benefits of being part of a larger network are
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Yoo, supra note 20, at 34-35.
Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1622-25 (2003).
32
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
33
See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
424, 439 (1985) (“[I]f the costs of adapting are negligible, and there are no other entry barriers, the market will be
perfectly competitive.”).
34
See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces, 40 J. INDUS. ECON.
9, 32 (1992) (“[C]onverters might seem to promise the benefits of compatibility without the loss of variety due to
31
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strong enough to induce standardization in the absence of converters but not strong enough to do
so in the presence of adapters, the availability of imperfect adapters can reduce social welfare.
Conversely, if the benefits of being part of a larger network are too weak to induce everyone to
join a single network, imperfect adapters tend to increase compatibility and social welfare.35
The fact that prioritization and other forms of network management represent precisely this form
of imperfect compatibility underscores that it is too facile simply to assume that the fact that
networks increase in value as they increase in size necessarily leads to market failure.

Debunking the Myth of the One Screen

The need for a single network to which all industry actors have open access is also tacitly
based on what I have called “the myth of the one screen”: the assumption that end users will rely
on a single Internet connection.36 The logic is simple. Only if end users maintain a single
broadband subscription is it important that they be able to access the entire universe of content
through any one connection. Conversely, if they maintain more than one connection, the fact that
one of them offers better connectivity to certain content and applications is less problematic.
One of the growing changes in the industry structure is the growing tendency for end
users to multi-home, that is, subscribe to more than one connection. Enterprise customers
routinely contract with multiple providers to protect against loss of service. End users also
routinely maintain both landlines and mobile phones to gain the advantage of mobility and to

standardization. Indeed, when converters are costless and perfect, this is true; but that is rare. In general, the
welfare impact of the availability of converters is ambiguous.”).
35
Id.
36
Yoo, supra note 21, at 122-26.
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guard against network failure.37 I suspect that in equilibrium everyone will maintain at least two
connections: one wired and one wireless. They may even optimize their usage to minimize cost
and to take advantage of the technical differences.38
Multi-homing creates several advantages. The ability to obtain service from an alternative
provider naturally restricts the market power that any one provider can exercise against any
user.39 More importantly for our purposes, requirements that every connection represent all
things to all people can be very costly. To take the most salient example, wireless broadband
providers are currently struggling to support video services. Requiring that they support all
applications on the same terms would require them to incur significantly higher capital expenses
in order to offer service, thereby increasing the number of subscriptions that the provider will
need to sell to break even. Given the severe restrictions on the available spectrum, this result will
both increase prices paid by consumers and will make it impossible to provide service on an
economical basis in marginal areas, thereby worsening the digital divide.

Private Networking as an Exit Option

The assumption that the Internet must remain open and universally interconnected also
overlooks the fact that the imposition of government regulation rarely results in a stable
equilibrium. Instead, the ultimate impact of such regulations can only be understood after the
series of reactions and counter-reactions that the regulations are likely to stimulate are taken into
account. Indeed, mandates of equal access to traditional telephone networks (along with attempts
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Yoo, supra note 5, at 86-88.
Id. at 87-88.
39
See Stanley M. Besen et al., Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements, 91 AM. ECON.
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 292, 292, 295 (2001).
38
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to use rates for interconnection to implement other social policies) stimulated demand for
private, bypass services that unless also regulated threatened to defeat the goals of the original
regulation.40
Consider the likely impact of the fact that the Open Internet Order contains exceptions for
purely private networks, networks that provide limited functionality, and specialized services.41
Providers subject to the Open Internet Order thus have strong incentives to bypass the public
Internet – and the accompanying regulations – simply by shifting their resources to private
networks. The problem is that shifting to dedicated networking resources eliminates one of the
central efficiencies created by the Internet by preventing multiple users to share resources. In
particular, network operators who need quality of service assurances will generally find it most
efficient to offer their bandwidth to others only on a secondary basis, available only when the
primary owner does not need it. Indeed, this is the central motivating principle underlying the
public safety network envisioned for the D-block in the 700 MHz auction42 as well commercial
offerings such as AT&T’s U-Verse and proposals for more efficient use of spectrum.43
Thus, those who advocate mandating open access in the name of preserving a unified
Internet must consider the possibility that such a mandate might actually create incentives toward
greater fragmentation. In addition, restricting network owners’ ability to share surplus capacity
threatens to increase the cost of broadband where it is available, while at the same time
worsening the digital divide by reducing the geographic areas in which such service can break
even.
40

See Dennis L. Weisman, The Proliferation of Private Networks and Its Implications for Regulatory Reform, 41
FED. COMM. L.J. 331 (1989).
41
Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at 17928 ¶39, 17933 ¶47, 17951 ¶79, 17965–66 ¶¶112-114.
42
Service Rules for the 698–746, 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands, Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15289,
15431 ¶396, 15437 ¶414, 15437 ¶416 (2007).
43
See Jon M. Peha & Sookan Panichpapiboon, Real-Time Secondary Markets for Spectrum, 28 TELECOMM. POL’Y
603, 604 (2004).
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Conclusion

The foregoing analysis raises two separate critiques to the claims that openness is a
critical aspect of the Internet’s past success that must be preserved. Any assessment of such a
categorical claim must grapple with the extent to which the Internet was, in fact, unified in the
past and with whether the circumstances that influenced the Internet in the past remain relevant
to the Internet’s future. Moreover, the unqualified manner in which this "single Internet" claim is
advanced obscures the reality that every important policy decision typically involves a tradeoff
between competing considerations. Most relevant for our purposes is the fact that mandating
open interconnection implicitly presumes that the exclusive source of value to end users is raw
increases in network size. Framing the issue in this manner fails to consider that end users
typically place a premium on being able to reach a small number of locations and run a discrete
number of applications. The policy analysis must also take into account that end users are likely
to maintain more than one connection and that any attempt to mandate open access is likely to
provoke a series of reactions and counter-reactions that may frustrate the goals of the initial
regulation.
On a broader level, policymakers would benefit from taking seriously the possibility that
the days of a “one size fits all” approach to Internet regulation may well be over and that looking
backwards for the lessons of the past may not always be the best way to promote future success.
As anyone can attest who experienced how quickly AOL keywords shifted from the critical way
to access customers to near-complete irrelevance, the technological and economic environment
surrounding the Internet is constantly undergoing rapid, dynamic change. The policies developed
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for a world dominated by PCs using cable modem or DSL service in which the browser was the
critical platform may no longer be the right framework for a world increasingly dominated by
smart phones attached to wireless broadband networks in which the critical platform is now the
app store and the wireless operating system. The growing heterogeneity of the technologies, end
user demands, and business relationships underlying what is now often referred to as the Internet
ecosystem may require reframing the issues in a fundamentally different manner.

